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PRUETT v. THOMPSON
996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1986, a Virginia Beach jury convicted David M. Pruett of rape,
robbery, and capital murder during the commission of, or subsequent to,
rape. Pruett confessed to police that he had been a friend of the victim,
that he had gone to her house while her husband was out of town, spoke
with her, decided to rob her and have sex with her, that she refused to have
sex until he produced a knife, that he raped, killed, and robbed her, and
that he attempted to conceal these facts. Pruett also confessed to robbing
and killing another woman in 1975. The jury sentenced Pruett to death.
Finding the death penalty appropriate because the crime satisfied both
the "vileness" and "future dangerousness" components of the capital
murder statute, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death
sentence.1
Pruett then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Virginia Beach
Circuit Court. The court dismissed some counts of the petition and
ordered an evidentiary hearing on the others. After the hearing, the
circuit court dismissed the petition in full. The Supreme Court of
Virginia and the United States Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.
2
Next, Pruett filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 3 The court denied the
petition and its request for an evidentiary hearing. Pruett then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, basing the
appeal on five grounds: (1) the state trial court erred in not instructing the
jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder during the guilt
phase of the trial; (2) prosecutorial misconduct infected the trial and
sentencing; (3) the jury instructions given at the penalty phase were
inadequate; (4) Pruett received ineffective assistance of trial and appel-
late counsel; and (5) the district court abused its discretion underTitle 28,
section 2254, of the United States Code, by failing to grant Pruett an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
4
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief and affirmed the
District Court's ruling.5 The court found that the first three of Pruett's
grounds for appeal were procedurally defaulted, and that the other two




Pruett v. Thompson is a primer on procedural default which will bar
federal review of constitutional claims. It emphasizes once again the
I Pruettv. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266,351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987).
2 Pruett v. Thompson, 495 U.S. 940 (1990).
3 Pruett v. Thompson, 771 F.Supp. 1428 (E.D. Va. 1991).
4 Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, 1564 (4th Cir. 1993).
5 Id. at 1563, 1577.
6 It is also necessary to assign these errors on direct appeal, and to
brief and argue them. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital
Case in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
importance of raising and preserving all federal claims at trial and on
direct appeal, as well as protecting them on collateral review. Its lesson
is that when correct procedure is not followed, claims are defaulted, and
defendants die. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25 states, "Error will not
be sustained to any ruling of the trial court ... unless the objection was
stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good
cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice."
6
Equally important is the requirement that all habeas claims be the same
claims as were preserved earlier. Habeas counsel may not be successful
in dividing a general claim of improper argument or jury instruction into
several discrete claims at that stage. These may be considered new and,
therefore, defaulted claims. In summary, to be preserved for further
review, aclaim must satisfy procedural (raisedboth at trial and on appeal)
and substantive (must actually be the same issue) requirements.
A. Default of Claim that Lesser Included Offense
Instruction Should Have Been Given at Trial
In two circumstances, Pruett could have been entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction on first degree murder. First, the jury could
have found that Pruett was guilty of premeditated murder, but not during
or subsequent to rape. Or second, the jury could have found that Pruett
was guilty of rape, but that he had no capacity to premeditate. 7 Evidence
tending to show the existence of either of these two circumstances, of
course, must have been presented at trial for Pruett to have been entitled
to a lesser included offense instruction. The trial judge found no such
evidence and refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.
Pruett forfeitedhis rightto appeal on eitherlesser included offense theory
due to procedural errors.
Predictably, the Fourth Circuit held that Pruett's claim of entitle-
ment to a lesser included offense instruction based on an absence of rape
theory was defaulted for failure to raise the issue on direct appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.8 Pruett's other claim of entitlement, based
on an "absence of capacity to premeditate" theory, was defaulted because
he did not raise it until his appeal from the denial of his state habeas
petition.9
B. Default of Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
Pruett's second ground for appeal demonstrates the importance of
complying with the substantive "same issue" requirement discussed
above. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pruett claimed
prosecutorial misconduct only with respect to the prosecutor's argument
at trial that Pruett's attorney had conceded guilt. Although this claim of
prosecutorial misconduct was preserved all the way through federal
district court, it was then defaulted because it was not appealed to the
7 See Virginia Code § 18.2-31 (1988): "The following offenses shall
constitute capital murder, punishable as a Class 1 felony ... The willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of,
or subsequent to, rape." See also Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32 (1988):
"Murder, other than capital murder ... by any willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit ...
rape ... is murder in the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony."
8 Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1570.
9 Id. at 1564.
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Fourth Circuit. Instead, Pruett presented for the first time before the
Fourth Circuit claims of prosecutorial misconduct based on different
portions of the argument of the Commonwealth's attorney. 10 The court
held these claims to be new, and therefore defaulted, because they were
never presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 1
C. Default of Challenge to Penalty Phase Instructions
The third ground Pruett raised suffered the same fate as the first two,
and for the same reason as the second. On direct appeal Pruett com-
plained of the trial judge's failure to instruct thejury that in the event they
could not agree to impose the death penalty, the court would impose a life
sentence. Pruett's habeas claim, however, was different; here he com-
plained of the trial judge's instructions concerning mitigation evidence.
Because the claim was not substantively the same, it was held to be
procedurally defaulted.
12
II. Relief from Default
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Procedural default does not always indicate the end of the line for
capital defendants. The refusal of federal courts to hear defaulted claims
10 Pruett presented new arguments which concerned prosecutorial
misconduct at both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of trial. Failure
to object to these alleged acts of misconduct might have been in itself
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because that may have been true,
Pruett might have been able to escape the trap of procedural default rules
by offering this ineffective assistance of counsel as the cause for default.
See infia section II.A. Unfortunately, Pruett never raised these claims in
his state habeas proceedings. When the Fourth Circuit finally heard
them, the court held that they were all insufficient bases for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and that they were all defaulted. These
new claims were: the prosecutor's offering of evidence as to the victim's
character, his "stating that he would offer evidence in aggravation at the
penalty phase, and [his] telling the jury ... that it should show Pruett the
same compassion that he had shown [the victim]" at the guilt phase; and
at the penalty phase, his saying that the death penalty would be appropri-
ate on the basis of the guilt-phase verdict alone, his saying "that the
Commonwealth could not conceive of a more appropriate case for the
death penalty," his arguing that mitigating evidence need not be consid-
ered by the jury and that the victim did not get due process or any
alternative to the penalty of death, his offering testimony of the husband
of the victim in the 1975 murder which described the victim's condition
after the murder, and his arguing that the 1975 murder was heinous.
Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1575-76.
11 Id. at 1576. Had these claims not been defaulted, they may have
had some merit. One example is the prosecutor's stating at the penalty
phase that the death penalty would be appropriate solely on the basis of
the guilt-phase verdict. See supra note 10. This was a misstatement of
the law; evidence both of aggravation and in mitigation must be consid-
ered. The prosecutor's statement is prohibited by Disciplinary Rules 7-
102(A)(2) and (5) of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility:
"In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [k]nowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, ... [or
k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact." A second example of
a claim which might have had merit is the prosecutor's arguing that since
the victim did not get due process or any alternative to the death penalty,
that Pruett also should not receive these. See supra note 10. This claim
may have led to success if supported by the reasoning ofZant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983). The prosecutor in Pruett in effect asked the jury to
consider the defendant's engaging in constitutionally protected conduct
- exercising his right to due process - as an aggravating factor. The
is a matter of comity, not jurisdiction. The case of Wainwright v. Sykes
provides that procedurally defaulted claims may be heard upon a show-
ing of (1) cause for non-compliance with state procedure and (2)
prejudice to the defendant. 13 Somewhat more broadly, Coleman v.
Thompson holds that review "is barred unless the prisoner can demon-
strate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, ordemonstrate that failure to consider the claims
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." 14 Coleman also
suggests that some extreme level of ineffective assistance of counsel can
be an excuse for default.
15
The Fourth Circuit held that ineffective assistance of counsel did not
excuse Pruett's failure to appeal the denial of the lesser included offense
instruction on the absence of rape theory.16 The court reasoned that it is
not ineffective assistance of counsel to make strategic decisions about
which issues are best suited for appeal; its conclusion was based on
language of Smith v. Murray:17 "This 'winnowing out weaker argu-
ments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from
being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate
advocacy." 18 In non-capital cases this may be true, but in the realm of
death penalty litigation, it is deadly advice which should never be
followed. 19
Pruett's other lesser included offense instruction claim, based on the
absence of premeditation theory, was also not excused on the basis of
Stephens court, however, would not allow this. Because in Stephens the
state had not "attached the 'aggravating' label to factors that are consti-
tutionally impermissible," the Court provided no relief. But the Court did
conclude that if the aggravating circumstance was invalid for a reason
such as constitutional impermissibility (which Pruett could have shown),
due process would require that the jury's decision in favor of the death
penalt be set aside. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 885.
IT Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1565, 1577.
13 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See also McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991) (applying the Wainwright v. Sykes standard). See also case
summary of McClesky, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 7(1991).
14 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (emphasis added). See also case
summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991).
15 Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2566-2567.
16 Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1569.
17 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
18 Id. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)).
19 See Bright, Death byLottery--ProceduralBar ofConstitutional
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent
Defendants, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 679 (1990). Bright illustrates that such
advice can be deadly through Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). In
that case the defendant was executed after his claims were held to be
procedurally defaulted. Smith's attorney had chosen not to pursue a
claim concerning unlawfully obtained psychiatric evidence; this issue
was raised on direct appeal, however, in an amicus curiae brief, but that
was held to be insufficient. 92 W. Va. L. Rev. at 686 n.39. The dissent
characterized this defaulted claim as "unquestionably ... meritorious,"
but said that its not being raised was "an unsurprising decision in view
of the fact that a governing ... precedent, which was then entirely valid
and only two years old, decisively barred the claim." Smith, 477 U.S. at
540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The lesson of Smith, in
particular, is that all non-frivolous claims in capital cases must be
preserved, including (and even especially) those flatly rejected by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The recent grant of certiorari in Simmons v.
South Carolina, 62 U.S.L.W. 3244 (Oct. 4, 1993), provides an example.
In Simmons, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial judge
did not make any appealable error under state law in refusing to give
accurate parole information to the jury. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d
175, 179 (S.C. 1993). If the United States Supreme Court holds that such
information is indeed required, such a holding will only help those
Virginia defendants who have preserved this issue during their trials.
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ineffective assistance of counsel. In fact, the court found "double
default." Pruett, of course, defaulted the instruction claim by failing to
raise it at trial or on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel as an excuse for defaulting
the underlying claim was not separately raised until the case reached the
Fourth Circuit. "[T]he very claim on which Pruett relies to establish
cause and prejudice for the procedural default of his claim with respect
to lack of premeditation ... is itself subject to dismissal for failure to
exhaust and, as well, would be procedurally defaulted under state law."20
It is important also to note the court's holding that ineffective assistance
of counsel claims offered as cause, or as an excuse for procedural default,
must be separate discrete claims. If such claims are not separately
appealed, they are defaulted on their own.
2 1
B. Innocence of Death Penalty
Another reason procedural default may not always be deadly to
capital defendants is the existence of a second excuse, actual "innocence
of the death penalty"; that is, innocence of the capital crime itself, or non-
existence of aggravating factors sufficient to support the death penalty.
The United States Supreme Court has held that to prove such a claim "one
must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional
error, no reasonablejuror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law."22 The Pruett court found
no constitutional error with respect to the trial judge's refusal to give the
lesser included offense instruction because there was no evidence
supporting Pruett's contention. Even if there had been error, the court
found that no reasonablejuror, given the chance, would have chosen first
degree murder over capital murder when assessing Pruett's guilt.
23
III. Avoiding Default - Lessons from Pruett
To avoid having a claim defaulted because it is not substantially the
same claim, trial counsel must make as many discrete objections and
20 Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1569.
21 See case summary of Justus v. Murray, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 14 (1990). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
489 (1986) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for
procedural default, but that the exhaustion doctrine "requires that a claim
of ineffective assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent
claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default").
22 Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992). See also case
summary ofSawyer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5,No. 1,p. 18(1992).
23 Pruett, 996 F.2d at 1570. The existence of aggravating factors
was not a part of this claim.
24 Attorneys can contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse
and the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, 1001 East
Main Street, Suite 510, Richmond, Virginia 23219, (804) 643-6845.
25 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,406 n. 9 (1988) (holding that
"[a] generic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is not sufficient to
preserve a constitutional claim based on an unidentified provision of the
Bill of Rights, but in this case the authority cited by petitioner and the
manner in which the fundamental right at issue has been described and
understood by the Illinois courts make it appropriate to conclude that the
claims of error as there are legal bases to support. Habeas counsel must
then brief and argue for the broadest possible interpretation of the claims
raised at trial. The Attorney General will argue for dismissal by
challenging every nuance of difference between what was raised at trial,
on appeal, and what is now in the habeas petition. Because of the
adversarial nature of our legal system, an expansion/contraction conflict
is almost inevitable in habeas cases. The defense attorney will attempt
to enlarge a claim's reach; the prosecutor, to narrow its reach. Inexpe-
rienced habeas counsel should be aware that this struggle is part of
collateral representation and should seek assistance.
24
At habeas, the Attorney General may also argue for dismissal by
challenging the grounds on which relief is sought. (Obviously, federal
courts have jurisdiction only over questions of federal law.) Any
variation between the grounds urged in the state court appeal and the
grounds urged in the habeas petition, the state will argue, is enough for
dismissal. Fortunately, however, the United States Supreme Court has
not required that unreasonably precise grounds forrelief be articulated.
25
Another lesson to be learned from Pruett is the importance of
interrupting opposing counsel's arguments and preserving appellate
issues. Not only must all grounds for appeal be raised during trial to be
reviewable on appeal, all objections must be made as soon as the
objectionable words are spoken. An issue will be considered defaulted
if it is not objected to immediately.26 Because of the rigid default rules
enforced by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the genteel tradition of not
interrupting argument must be abandoned in capital cases. It should be
possible to interrupt and make the record without abandoning the
laudable goal of civility in litigation. 27 In any event, however, it must be
done.
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl
constitutional question was sufficiently well presented to the state courts
to support ourjurisdiction"). See also Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547,
1550 (1992) (Defendant"preserved his equal protection claim before the
Court of Criminal Appeals. His argument caption made an express
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment and the issue presented for
review was the very one that he had raised before the trial court."). See
also case summary of Trevino, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1,
p. 20 (1992).
26 See Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 279, 427 S.E.2d
411,419 (1993) and case summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
27 The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility commands that"[i]n appearing in his professional capac-
ity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not... [flail to comply with known
local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal
without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his intent not to
comply." DR7-106(C)(5) (1983). See also the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia (1983). Canon EC 7-35 suggests in similar fashion that
an attorney "be courteous to opposing counsel ..."
